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                                                                 Abstract 
 
 
The socio-economic impacts of microcredits on women’s welfare were studied in North 
Eastern South Africa using qualitative semi-structured interviewing method. The study 
especially focuses on the benefits, disadvantages and challenges obtained from the Small 
Enterprise Foundation (SEF) microcredit programmes (MCP and TCP) in sustainable 
livelihoods framework. In two case villages, impacts of microcredits and comparison of two 
programmes were analysed on household level. The nature of credit allocation and SEF 
clients’ repayment performance was analyzed with the credit rationing model.  
The results reveal that a number of poorest women have been released out of deepest poverty 
through the opportunities provided by SEF. The MCP clients, who tend to have a better 
starting point, seemed to be more educated, able to diversify and improve their businesses as 
well as more capable to protect against vulnerability than the poorer TCP clients. Many 
repayment problems were caused by group heterogeneity. Especially in the MCP the 
phenomenon of moral hazard (in the presence of joint liability) seemed to be a problem. 
These drawbacks reflect that there are still some unsettled disadvantages in programmes.  
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 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In many countries traditional financial institutions are concentrating on large-scale loans 
removing from the area of aid to small enterprises (Woller and Woodworth 2001ab, Todaro 
2000, Jabbar et al. 2002). Access to credit is especially restricted for the poor, owing to their 
inability to provide collateral and thus credit risks are excessive. Potential clients live in 
remote rural villages behind the reach of the commercial banking system, where monitoring 
and enforcement costs are high, and returns on investments low (Snow et al. 2001). If some 
sort of local private banking system exists it is characterized by high interest rates, by 
connections with other local markets, such as land, labor and crop, and by significant credit 
rationing. Because of credit rationing the borrowers are unable to borrow all they want, or 
some loan applicants are unable to borrow at all (Ma and Smith 1996).  
 
The theory of credit rationing originates with the paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Credit 
rationing is outcome of fact that lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers of different 
degrees of risk, and that loan contracts are subject to limited liability. Since lender’s 
preferences over project risk run counter to these of borrowers, they may hold interest rates at 
levels below market-clearing rates and ratio borrowers in order to achieve a better 
composition and lower risk in their portfolio. Although lenders possess in traditional rural 
societies a great deal of information about relevant borrower characteristics the returns of 
investment are still greatly affected by local conditions and the borrower’s actions. When 
loanable funds and collateral actions are limited credit rationing appears with high interest 
rates. As long as the borrower does not have enough wealth to guarantee the full value of the 
loan, higher interest rates cause the problem of debt overhang since the investor captures only 
a small fraction of returns. Subsequently, the level of borrower’s effort avoiding low yield 
states may be depressed. Thus an increase in the size of collateral leads to fall in interest rate 
and debt and an increase in effort. (Ghosh et al. 2000). Without collateral the social norms 
and close social networks can be useful in mitigating the credit rationing problems.  
 
On partial solution is the system of microfinance based on the peer monitoring: having co-
investors, neighbours or relatives who are in a good position to monitor the borrower and 
required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. The local banking system can provide 
larger loans as it is able to exploit the local knowledge of the members of social 
responsibilities. It has devised an incentive structure whereby others with in the village do the 
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 monitoring for it. They have been induced to bear more risks than they otherwise would 
(Stiglitz 1990, Arnott & Stiglitz 1991).  
 
Thus microfinance is expanding as a grass-roots instrument for alleviating poverty and 
improving the poor’s access to financial services especially in developing countries1. The loan 
is intended especially for poor women to buy the initial goods that are needed to start or 
improve a small business. The objective is to break the vicious circle of poverty consisting of 
low capital, productivity, income, and savings (Evans et al 1999, Woller and Woodworth 
2001ab, Anderson et al. 2001). 
 
It is argued that microfinance may improve women’s empowerment and general welfare by 
expanding their social and economic opportunities and reducing vulnerability (Newaz 2001, 
2003) and even contribute to reduced fertility (Anderson et al. 2002). Moreover, women 
spend a large proportion of what they earn on household expenses that serve to benefit the 
family as a whole (Kabeer 2000). 
 
Despite these impressive benefits recent studies have pointed out several social and economic 
problems in some of the programmes. These are the high interest rate (Hossain 2002), the risk 
to end up in a circle of debt (Snow et al. 2001), the fragility of credit-financed household 
(Floro and Dymski 2000), the risk of free-riding and conflicts between villagers and gender 
(Hossain 2002). Moreover, in practice, microfinance may still not reach the very poorest, 
since some borrowers experience still credit rationing in microcredit programmes including 
inequality in terms of benefits and loan sizes as well as limited access to services (Stix 1997, 
Baydas et al 1994, de Meza and Webb 2000). 
 
The present study aimed at gaining a better understanding of how microcredit projects impact 
on rural women’s livelihood structures, and how they can strengthen women’s welfare. It was 
focusing on the operations of the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) that is serving the 
residents in former homelands in South Africa. Specifically, the study aimed at: 
1) Assessing the impacts of women’s group loans in the sustainable livelihoods framework, 
particularly when livelihood outcomes to be achieved are more income, increased well-
being, reduced vulnerability and improved food security on household level; 
                                                 
1 In the early 1980’s, the Grameen bank of Bangladesh initiated the microfinance movement, currently the 
world’s best-known provider of microcredit. Recent statistics on the global outreach of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) report that over 30 million families have access to microfinance services, of which more than 19 million 
qualified as the poorest who are particularly women.  
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 2) Studying the influence of other activities than loans (e.g. motivation and on-going 
support) of the microcredit projects on the maintenance of local people’s livelihood 
structures;  
3) Additionally investigating the nature of microcredit allocation under credit market 
imperfections and its consequences for repayment behaviour in general, and further 
relating these issues to the operations of the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) in its aim 
to reach to the poorest of the poor. 
 
II.  MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
II.1  Study area and the basic livelihood structure 
The research was carried out in the Northern Province of South Africa, where the Small 
Enterprise Foundation (SEF) has been serving the residents in the three former homeland 
areas, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda, since its launch in 1991. South Africa’s northernmost 
province borders on Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and is one of the poorest areas 
of the country. Most of its economic activity is focused on farming. Industrial activity is 
limited to small mining operations. The province has the highest rates of unemployment, 
illiteracy and birth in all of the country, unemployment reaching even the level of 80 %. 
Tzaneen is one of the largest commercial centres in the province, with a population of 80,000. 
Bungeni and Mankweng villages are situated in the surrounding area. The number of people 
inhabiting the villages is uncertain. They represent mainly Venda, Sotho and Tsonga 
languages.  
 
In the Northern Province, African people comprise 97 % of the population. Because of 
separation of rural homelands by the nation’s former apartheid regime inequality still exits 
with a poor infrastructure, limited access to resources, and poor economic opportunities. 
Rural black women are the bottoms of the heap because of the discrimination on grounds of 
race, class and gender (Deegan 1999). High population density and poor land quality provide 
only minor income opportunities. Limitation of final services is gradually changing with the 
advent of the micro-lending industry and since the establishment of the Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council (MFRC) in 1999. MFRC has now registered more than 1,247 micro-
lenders represented through more than 6,775 branches. 
  
The SEF is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation, and applying the methods of 
Grameen Bank that extends loans to groups of five in joint liability basis. SEF’s Head Office 
 4
 is located in the town of Tzaneen working with a target population of about 65,000 rural 
villagers around the town. The SEF has two separate programmes, the original Micro Credit 
Programme (MCP) consisting of 8,163 active clients2 and the Tšhomisano3 Credit Programme 
(TCP), a poverty targeted programme which was started in 1996 and consists nowadays of 
5,224 members (SEF 2002a). In 2000, there were 5 MCP branches employing 33 field 
workers and the TCP had 4 branches employing 17 field workers. Approximately 98 % of the 
SEF’s clients are female. TCP clients are the poorest of the poor based on a targeting 
methodology, Participatory Wealth Ranking, using the “household subsistence” level as the 
poverty line. In 2001 this stood at R9204 (100 EUR) per family of five per month. 40 % of 
households in the Northern Province live below half of this line.  
 
After its launch in 1991, the SEF has distributed some 100 000 loans valued more than 100 
million rand (11 million EUR). In June 2002 the SEF served 13,387 clients in the value of 
R8.0 million (890 000 EUR), and was forced to write-off R38,695 (4,340 EUR) (SEF 2002a). 
Ten years after launching its program of lending, 68% of the SEF’s clients were financially 
sustainable. The SEF is attempting to combine targeting the poorest, poverty alleviation and 
financial self-sustainability aiming for financial self-sustainability by June 2005. 
Sustainability has been managed to achieve through several donors, most importantly with the 
ongoing support of The United States Agency for International Development, The Ford 
Foundation, Hivos and ImpAct – A Ford Foundation/Institute of Development Studies project 
(SEF 2002a).  
 
II.2  Data collection and analysis 
The empirical fieldwork was done in February-March 2003 with assistance of the Small 
Enterprise Foundation (SEF). The research involved semi-structured interviews with 21 
entrepreneurs from participants in the SEF microenterprise programmes, consisting of 10 
clients in the Micro Credit Programme (MCP) and 11 clients in the Tšhomisano Credit 
Programme (TCP). The fieldwork was implemented by attending six different centre meetings 
in the villages of Mankweng and Bungeni. 
 
The questionnaire schedule comprised both closed-question and open-ended narrative 
sections. The closed section collected background information about the identity of the 
respondent. It covered basic livelihood information, loan history and performance, experience 
                                                 
2 In June 2002 
3 Tšhomisano is the Northern Sotho word meaning “Working together” 
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 and level of education. The open section dealt in turn with changes in household and business 
activities, experience as a group member, income and expenditure, impact on social welfare 
and livelihood structure, and perceptions for the future. Villagers were also asked to list 
suggestions on what the SEF should do to improve its microcredit operations. Open-ended 
questions were designed to encourage respondents to describe their experience in their own 
words. It was also paid careful attention to question design to gaining rich and useful 
information on impacts (Wright 2002).  
 
All questions were printed in English but interpreted to local languages, Venda, Sotho and 
Tsonga. Short summaries were typed up of the narrative sections, drawing upon memory and 
field notes (Table 2). For a wider qualitative analysis the table was read systematically 
column by column. Comparing clients from the two different programmes were done 
additionally through cross-tabulations and means tests. The results were scored, and then 
entered onto a single database along with pre-coded data from the closed section of the 
interview schedule. The impact scores could then be analysed (through cross-tabulation) 
against pre-coded variables.  
 
Table 2. Illustration of qualitative analysis of narrative summaries. 
Topic/level Respondent 1 Respondent 2 Respondent 3 Respondent 4 
Business 
activity 
Selling ice cream, 
lemonade, blankets, 
chicken, old clothes 
Selling drinks, fish, 
cakes 
Selling fruits, juice Knitting and sewing 
clothes 
Material 
impact on 
business 
Able to buy stock and 
to improve business 
Able to run business Able to run business Able to improve 
business, to buy new 
knitting and sewing 
machines and 
material. Bought a 
car. Built a workshop. 
Material 
impact on 
household 
Able to buy more food Able to buy meat, 
fruits 
Started to build a 
house 
Has built a house 
Material 
impact on 
individual 
Able to buy more 
needed items 
Able to buy clothes 
and needed items 
Able buy more needed 
items 
Able to buy needed 
items 
Material 
impact on 
children 
Able to pay school 
fees and to buy 
clothes for children 
Able to buy more food 
and sometimes 
Goodies 
Able to pay school 
fees and to buy 
clothes for children 
Able to buy needed 
items for children 
Financial 
impact 
Can take care of the 
costs 
Financial situation has 
improved 
Not enough money to 
buy all the needed 
items 
Money covers all the 
costs and solves 
financial problems 
… 
 
… … … … 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Calculated in March 2003 when the EUR/Rand exchange rate stood close to EUR = R8,9  
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 III.  RESULTS 
 
III.1  Socio-economic impacts of SEF microcredits 
The interviewed clients volunteered mostly positive comments expressing their opinions of 
the importance of SEF operations. Motivation and business training supported by the 
company were appreciated especially within the Tšhomisano Credit Programme (TCP). When 
they join microfinance programme, the women are usually unemployed with minimal 
opportunities and experience in business running. Most women in the Micro Credit 
Programme (MCP) in turn only lack of finance but have most basic business skills in advance.  
 
Membership in SEF programmes seemed to increase the women’s self-confidence and 
willingness to participate in activities in their communities. Eight of all ten MCP clients 
indicated higher self-confidence than before. They also said to be particularly proud of their 
businesses and financial contribution. This empowerment dynamic is undoubtedly one of the 
major non-financial benefits of the programmes. Running a business contributes to women’s 
improved welfare. Although women’s problems were not entirely resolved, most clients 
considered life was easier than before. The study showed that through the SEF’s loans TCP 
clients who used to be unemployed were able to employ themselves by running their 
businesses.  
 
Respondent 1 (TCP):”Since I started in the program I realised a big change in financial 
matter. Now I’m able to buy bricks for a house and different things for my family. …In future 
I hope that the loan sizes will grow so that I would be able to buy bigger stock and improve 
my business. …I also hope that SEF could help children to go to school.” 
 
Especially in the MCP some women were able to diversify into more profitable product lines 
due to increased capital after joining the programme, but there were success stories within the 
TCP as well (Respondent 4).  
 
Respondent 4 (TCP): “There is an extremely serious unemployment problem in this area. 
People lack incomes struggling permanently in the poverty. I have been lucky.…After joining 
SEF credit programme, I have been able to buy stock and new materials, and improve my 
sewing business. Now I have one knitting and three sewing machines, and I can run my own 
clothing business successfully.…I have built a new house and my own workshop.”  
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 Two of the ten MCP clients believed to be able to grow their businesses so that they will 
finally reach self-sustainability. Six MCP clients and three TCP clients said that their financial 
situation had improved significantly since joining the programme. The influence could be 
seen in the form of ability to buy more of needed items and improved food security, among 
others.  
 
All the women interviewed in both programmes said their husbands and/or families supported 
their joining the programme. In the TCP it was common that households were headed by the 
women who alone provided for the family when the husbands were either unemployed or 
passed away, or they did not have husbands at all. To decrease the likelihood of opposition to 
their participation by family elders, the SEF encourages clients to discuss the programme and 
the loan with their families. The SEF’s drop-out studies indicate that the number of clients 
dropping out due to spouse’s opposition is deminimus. In regard to the question of whether 
microfinance reinforces traditional gender roles, in the SEF programmes, there is no 
correlation of increased loan size between female and male clients.  
 
While credits are essential for the poor to ensure their financial well-being, it is critical that 
savings are encouraged to increase clients’ assets. The SEF does not require deposit or 
proportion of loan as a savings component to cover possible economical losses, or ever 
directly handle clients’ repayments. However, clients are encouraged to save a small amount 
of money on a fortnightly basis as part of the membership criteria. Before the disbursement of 
the first loan, the group has to open a group savings account and demonstrate their ability to 
save. These savings along the repayment performance will impact whether clients are 
considered good members and on the next loan size. However, despite the pressure the SEF 
brings to clients regarding the savings, it became evident in the centre meetings that either 
clients were unable to save or the significance of savings was not completely internalised. 
Relatively few clients per meeting seemed to be able to contribute to the savings account, and 
the average size of deposits was relatively low. 
 
Microcredits undoubtedly contribute to the survival of families who are living on the margins 
of absolute poverty. However, the SEF has not been able to eliminate vulnerability among 
TCP clients through microcredits. The most serious problems among the TCP clients were 
unemployment and income insufficiency in regard to meeting their basic needs. Although 
most found their financial situation improved and life become easier, all the financial 
problems can hardly be seen as entirely resolved. Credit and possible economic returns 
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 dwindle for both new stock supplement and daily household costs. Some of the women may 
too be able to afford more diversified commodities, but still others face serious problems with 
finance having difficulties to provide for sufficient food security and education of children. 
Besides these, the women were concerned about health care and untrustworthy clients. 
 
Their problems notwithstanding all ten of the MCP clients said that their lives had become 
easier due to credits. For five of them, the financial situation had improved crucially. The 
most remarkable improvements were seen in improved food security and opportunity to meet 
responsibilities and household needs. Six of the interviewed were able to pay children’s 
school fees. However, it was exposed that while paying school fees, the family did not always 
have enough money for food. Yet all the needs could not be supplied. Half of the women 
complained about inadequate and irregular income, deceitful clients, and loan repayment 
problems. The clients did not complain about too high interest rates. No one accused rules of 
being too strict or hard to follow, but yet sometimes unstable.  
 
Among the mostly positive comments of the SEF operations, the villagers volunteered also 
some criticism granting some wishes for future. In the TCP most of the clients requested 
bigger loan sizes that would be essential to grow and improve their businesses. Especially in 
the MCP, besides the bigger loan sizes, the SEF was requested to admit individual loans so 
that every member should guarantee solely their own loans. The most negative comments 
were connected to repayment problems. Half of the interviewed in the MCP complained about 
unreliable group members. Further, two of them had considered leaving off due to these 
problems.  
 
Respondent 8 (MCP): “Some women want their money immediately, and use it for everything 
else but their businesses. …To improve their businesses they should invest. Some women do 
not invest rationally, and they do not work. How could they manage? …These group loans 
favour the poorest. Why should I suffer, work hard and repay their loans, if they could not or 
did not want to do anything?” 
 
It was also mentioned that sometimes loan sizes were too big for members to control, and that 
way caused difficulties for other members who had to guarantee the loan. Although TCP 
clients who were interviewed did not mention unreliable group members as a big problem, it 
revealed in the meeting discussions (concerning their successes or defaults) that there were 
some problems in regard to group relations, as demonstrated below.  
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Client in TCP meeting, Bungeni: “We joined the group because we are extremely poor. Those 
who do not repay their loans should leave off the group.…They should at least show up in 
these meetings and explain why they are not able to pay up, and not to leave other members 
to take responsibility of their defaults.…It seems that people have not internalised the 
principles and rules. SEF has to do something for this issue.” 
 
Both the TCP and the MCP have high drop out rates (i.e. percentage of clients who complete 
their loans and do not return for a further loan) reaching the level of 33 percent (SEF 2002a). 
In drive to attain self-sufficiency quickly the SEF introduced a new incentive scheme in 2000. 
However, the intention to provide strongest clients with larger loans failed, when a major part 
of the field staff pushed loan sizes with all their clients. Too big loan sizes lead to repayment 
problems, dissatisfaction, and clients preferring to leave their program, resulting increase in 
drop-out rates. Loan policies that allowed the pushing of loan sizes have now been revised. 
Increase in loan sizes has linked to the growth of clients’ businesses, and to bring the drop-out 
rates down interest rates have been increased (SEF 2001, 2002a). The SEF has been trying to 
resolve the repayment and drop-out problems also by creating strict rules for group 
establishment. Women are provided with learning process divided into three sections: (i) 
motivation, (ii) business planning, and (iii) continuous support. To prevent getting into 
overdebt, informal loans are forbidden.   
 
III.2  Comparison between two microcredit programmes TCP and MCP 
The wealthier borrowers seemed to have a significantly better starting point than the poorer 
ones. Mankweng, the village in which the Micro Credit Programme (MCP) was founded, 
provided a more urban setting and quality of services than the poorer Bungeni for Tšhomisano 
Credit Programme (TCP) clients. While all the interviewed TCP clients said there were no 
other incomes in the household besides the loan, in the MCP five of ten women said they 
were providing for the family together with their husbands. Business activities in both 
programmes consisted mostly of fruit, juice, beer, tobacco, textiles and vegetable hawking, 
and thus concentrated on the sectors with a low level of profitability. The biggest problem in 
trading lie upon a narrow profit margin, wide competition and poor customers, which are a 
serious problem especially among TCP clients.  
 
In addition to the qualitative analysis, comparing clients from the two different programmes 
was done through cross-tabulations and means tests. In obtaining a Pearson’s correlation 
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 coefficient as well as the associated significance level for two variables it was used the SPSS-
programme. Statistically significant differences were revealed with relation to level of 
education, size of the first loan, and furthermore profits (Table 3). Most of the TCP clients 
were inexperienced and very poor with no or minor education. One interesting result was the 
positive correlation between education and children’s well-being (p<0.05). Data also shows 
that MCP clients were provided with bigger loan sizes in the beginning. The most common 
loan size in both programmes was R500.  However, one third part of TCP clients had R300 or 
less as their first loan in contrast to wealthier MCP clients of whom one third part reached the 
level of R600-800. These results indicate that MCP clients appear to be more educated, and 
have access to bigger loan sizes when joining the microcredit programme. These 
characteristics connected with more business experience provide MCP clients with better 
fundaments for business management and diversification. 
 
A great proportion of TCP clients were able to make profits of an amount of R50 per month at 
most, while in contrast only one of MCP client stayed at this level. Additionally, half of MCP 
clients made profits more than R500 per month.. These comparisons are fairly analogous to 
the qualitative analysis, and indicate TCP clients to be very vulnerable against financial 
shocks. MCP clients, in turn, seem to be less vulnerable, but are still subjected to a great risk 
to be driven back into deep poverty. 
 
Besides the differences between different programmes, there seemed to be differences 
between clients within the same programme in relation to professional skills, business 
management and returns. In the TCP, women whose source of income was in textiles and 
sewing were on average admitted bigger loan sizes in the beginning, and they were able to 
grow their loan sizes more compared to those who were in basic grocery business. The size of 
dressmakers’ last loan ranges from R1,700 to R4,500, while for example fruit and drink 
sellers had to content them with a maximum loan size of R1,000. Furthermore, it was found a 
strong positive correlation between the loan size and both profits (p<0.01), savings, food 
security, and business and financial improvement (p<0.05). These skilled women were more 
easily able to pay children’s school fees, save money for building a house or obtain new 
machines, and solve their financial problems. One interesting observation was the positive 
correlation between profits and years of participation (p<0.05), which implies that positive 
impacts might sometimes be distinguishable only in the long term. 
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 Within the MCP differences were not quite that obvious. However, there seemed to be some 
differences in relation to professional skills, loan sizes and economic returns. A greater 
proportion (80 %) of fruit and juice sellers made profits less than R400 per month as opposed 
to dressmakers and tailors who all reached the level of a minimum of R500 per month. 
Positive correlation was found between profits and size of the first (p<0.01) and the last loan 
(p<0.05), savings (p<0.01), and business and financial improvements (p<0.05). In terms of 
business or financial impacts, however, cross-tabulation proves that disparities between 
different job characteristics were not as strong as in the TCP. This may result from the fact 
that since the family is not extremely poor in the beginning, the financial or business impacts 
may not be so considerable, although things might be more secure. In the TCP, in turn, 
changes in income appeared to have a great impact on food security, and both on business and 
financial improvement.   
 
Table 3. Characteristics of the sample. 
 
Indicators Mean in TCP Mean in MCP 
Sample Size 11 10 
Female headed households 60 % 20% 
Education 1,6 years 5,1 years 
Size of first loan R395 R570 
Size of last loan R1390 R1330 
Profits R452 (per month) R745 (per month) 
Savings R63 (per month) R52 (per month) 
 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that there are no significant differences in regard to savings between 
these two groups, and even that the accumulation has been stronger in the TCP. This result is 
inconsistent with the evidence revealed in the qualitative analysis that suggests that MCP 
clients are more capable to protect themselves against vulnerability through savings and assets 
than the women in the TCP. It is justified to note that most of TCP clients were able to deposit 
savings of a maximum of R50 per month. Two of eleven members were able to save R200-
300 per month, which has a strong effect on mean value. The setting is analogous to the MCP 
where only one member reached the level of R300. In regard to profits and savings, the 
standard deviation is remarkable in both programmes. Besides the distortion in mean value, 
disagreement will be explained by the fact that qualitative analysis is strongly affected by the 
general feature experienced in centre meetings. Moreover, it was exposed in the interviews 
that women in the TCP had no assets or savings to protect themselves against sudden costs, 
and were instead still unable to meet even their basic needs, since all incomes went to a new 
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 stock or household expenditures. In summary, it is apparent that clients in both programmes 
do have difficulties to deposit remarkable savings. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that there are distinct differences between clients in the poorer 
TCP and the wealthier MCP (Table 4). Wealthier borrowers tend to have a better starting 
point than the poorer ones, and they are more likely to be able to diversify and improve their 
businesses. MCP clients are less vulnerable against financial shocks and can solve many 
financial problems, while TCP clients still have difficulties to meet their basic needs. 
 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of SEF microcredit programmes.  
 
 MCP TCP 
Starting point and 
income sources 
Existing business. More educated. Larger 
loans in the beginning. Often someone else 
in the family who brings extra income. 
Unemployment. No experience in business 
running. Minor education. Lower loan sizes in 
the beginning. Mainly women-headed 
household with no other incomes in the family.
Business 
opportunities and 
finance 
Better opportunities to diversify and 
improve incomes 
Usually no opportunities to diversify or 
improve incomes 
Social impact and 
well-being 
Improved self-confidence. Able to make 
changes in life. Opportunity to health care. 
Life in general easier than before. 
Low or somehow improved self-confidence. 
Still difficulties to get health services. Life in 
general easier than before. 
Food security and 
basic needs 
Improved food security. Able to meet most 
basic needs. 
Food security difficult or somehow improved 
but still difficulties to meet basic needs. 
Vulnerability Less vulnerable being somewhat able to 
protect against financial shocks. Risk to be 
driven back to the poverty. 
Very vulnerable having no savings or assets to 
protect against unexpected expenditures. Has 
to rely on neighbours help and loans. 
Training and 
motivating 
Usually have business skills. Money is the 
problem. 
Appreciates training, learns how to run 
business 
Biggest problems Unreliable group members and joint 
liability 
Meeting the basic needs. Vulnerability. Group 
members who don’t repay their loans. Income 
insufficiency. 
 
 
 
III.3  Credit rationing and credit market imperfections 
In this section it is tried to describe the standard practice that the Small Enterprise Foundation 
(SEF) applies in loan admittance and borrowers’ identification, and how the SEF handles the 
credit rationing and asymmetric information problems. Before launching microfinance 
activities both the staff and loan applicants have to go through a long training and recognition 
process. The SEF services are strictly targeted to a well-defined set of clients, the basic 
criterion used in the Micro Credit Programme (MCP) is the 6-month experience in 
entrepreneurship, and in the Tšhomisano Credit Programme (TCP) the position in the 
participatory Wealth Ranking (PWR). The aim is particularly to reach the poorest of the poor. 
The SEF first identifies areas where it is targeting the programmes based on population and 
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 economic status. With the village elders’ consent the SEF will arrange for a PWR and 
meetings to promote the SEF in the community via motivations. The SEF resolves client 
information problems by identifying borrowers through special group recognition. If the 
necessary qualifications have been complied, the group is allowed to start training, which is a 
six-day process. Resource restraints and strict training may still limit access to SEF services. 
Applications that seem to be too risky will be rejected. Moreover, the meeting requirement 
and the pressure to repay a loan can be an additional burden on participants.  
 
In order to evaluate the important factors used in credit rationing, the data is inadequate to 
verify the credit demand and supply equations. There are yet many interesting questions to 
consider related to credit rationing and SEF operations. The basic fact is that microcredit 
lenders grant larger loans at higher interest rates and for longer terms. In the SEF programmes 
all first loan clients’ repayments are based on a term of 8 fortnights, with a higher effective 
interest rate than clients on subsequent cycles. Groups choose from the following terms: 4, 6, 
or 10 months of which four or six-month terms could be repaid monthly or fortnightly (Table 
5). It can be seen that the straight interest rate is higher for the loans that can be repayed 
monthly than the loans that are to be repaid on fortnightly basis. The straight interest rate is 
higher at longer terms, too. However, the SEF does not grant larger loans at higher straight 
interest rates. 
 
Table 5. Interest rates and Repayments of SEF loans (SEF 2002b). 
 
Loan Term 8FN 12FN 4Mo 6Mo 10Mo 
Instalment per R100 Loan 14.50 10 29 20.50 14 
Total Interest Paid per R100 Loan 16 20 16 23 40 
Effective Interest Rate  82.15 % 70.1 % 74.6% 75.1% 79.6% 
Straight Interest Rate 16 % 20 % 16 % 23 % 40 % 
 
 
As usual in microfinance, SEF contracts are self-enforcing so that subsequent loans are based 
on individual performance in regard to saving, attendance in the meetings and repayment, as 
well as existing business size (stock, savings, cash, debtors and capital expenditure). The SEF 
evaluates business type as a factor in determining first loan size giving holders of knitting, 
tailoring and clothing greater access to credit. To the question whether profitable business 
encourages borrowers to incur greater financial risk through increased borrowing, it can be 
remarked that (i) it was found a strong positive correlation between loan size and profits 
(p<0.01), (ii) the SEF pushes bigger loans for successful clients, and (iii) most clients 
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 requested bigger loan sizes. These results do not conflict the implications of credit rationing 
model described in Section 1.  
  
As revealed in the interviews, too big loan sizes caused repayment problems and thus 
difficulties for other members who had to guarantee the loan. Although the SEF possesses lots 
of information about relevant characteristics of borrowers, it is impossible for the staff to 
flawlessly distinguish between the more and less successful clients which may lead to 
admitting too big loan sizes. Repayment problems seem to reflect that the problem of debt 
overhang is still evident. Free riding problems are also found since several clients complained 
about unreliable group members who did not want work to or feel like working, or did not 
show up in the meetings.  
 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) plays an important role in strengthening women’s 
welfare in the study area. By providing financial services and in that way job opportunities, it 
may influence powerfully on rural women’s socio-economic situation and improve security. 
Targeting strictly women who live below half of the poverty line, the Tšhomisano Credit 
Programme (TCP) is able to reach the very poorest women., while the MCP in contrast is 
reaching people who are better off. Although SEF interest rates are higher than commercial 
rates, it must be noticed that while loan sizes are small and the repayment time is short, a 
small change in repayment terms might have an immense impact on the effective interest rate 
(based on a declining balance) but will be a nearly insignificant factor in the context of the 
borrower’s welfare.  
 
It was found a positive correlation between education and turnover. The better-off MCP 
clients were more educated and literate than TCP clients. The lack of education compromises 
the ability to understand the benefits of credit. Moreover, the educated women would have 
additional benefits for their children. A strong positive correlation between loan size and 
profits was also found. However many clients especially in the TCP criticised the SEF for 
providing too low credit lines. The women were not able to grow stock, which would have 
been a necessity for business expansion. There is a good reason for taking a cautious attitude 
toward increased credit lines. It is vitally important that the loan size will take into account 
limited risk-bearing abilities and capacities of the poor. Therefore, in the presence of 
informational asymmetries and the moral hazard dilemma, increase in loan sizes should be 
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 granted only after a careful investigation of risks, and also be made conditional upon previous 
repayment performance. Sharma and Zeller (1997) inquire about objective and realistic 
project evaluation, which they see to be necessary prior to loan approval.  
 
Stiglitz (1990) suggests that there are more incentives for similar individuals to form groups, 
as information asymmetry between members is expected to be lower in homogenous groups. 
In this study, it was noticed that a number of repayment problems in groups were caused by 
mixed income level and internal inequality. Especially in the MCP an incentive to free-ride 
seemed to be a problem, which reflects the need and importance of dynamic incentives. In 
heterogeneous groups the income gap between better- and worse-off clients may grow 
remarkably. Sharma and Zeller (1997) argue that a group member may choose to finance a 
riskier project than she would when liability is not shared with others. Their analysis also 
indicates that asset and enterprise diversity within groups significantly affect repayment rates. 
High drop-out rates indicate that there in turn are lots of membership changes in groups, 
which may have an influence on the effectiveness of the self-selection and enforcement 
factors of the joint-guarantee methodology. The strong correlation between profits, loan size 
and time of participation implies that new members will guarantee the larger loans taken by 
long-term clients, which may lead to difficulties to overcome the weaker borrowers’ incentive 
to free-ride. These problems are of critical point in the microfinance industry, and might never 
be entirely resolved. However, group members have better opportunity to obtain, at a lower 
cost, information regarding the reputation, indebtedness, and wealth of the loan applicant, and 
her effort performance, than the institutional borrower. 
 
Reaching financial sustainability with targeting the poorest is a great challenge for the 
microfinance industry. Many microcredit institutes are financed partly by donors, since 
generating a sufficient cash flow from operations alone is usually difficult. It can be 
questioned, however, whether targeting self-sustainability is necessary if there is an 
opportunity for donor money. The key is increasing cost-effectiveness, which would 
presumably be at the expense of poverty targeting. Maximising institutional and field staff 
efficiency together with cutting costs might without doubt have a negative influence on the 
poorest, who request a great contribution in regard to monitoring and business training.  
 
Although many important economic and social impacts of microcredits have been clarified in 
this study, it is still unable to provide a final answer to the question of the total effect of the 
microcredits on local livelihoods, even in this single case observed in Tzaneen area. The 
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 results are still related only to a limited area, and the data has been gathered within only a 
limited period of time. It is, however, able to summarise cautiously the difficulties and 
opportunities that are directed towards microfinance in Southern Africa, in areas that share 
similar socio-economic setting. In this context it can be argued that, when properly designed, 
microfinance institutions like The Small Enterprise Foundation have an important 
contribution to make to women’s empowerment.  
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